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Since the early nineties, PPP use has been increasing over the years across most of the 
developed countries in the world. Despite, or because of, its growing usage and 
importance in government financial sheets, its valuation has always been controversial, 
with the literature being less than unanimous. 
 
In this article we will propose a different valuation method for this type of project based 
on the Black-Scholes Model and show how to take into account other non-explicit 
advantages that the use of option valuation can bring to the project being studied.  





Desde o início da década de 90, o uso de PPPs tem crescido em todo os países 
desenvolvidos do planeta. Apesar de, ou motivado por, a sua utilização e importância 
para os Governos ser cada vez maior, a sua avaliação sempre foi controversa, com a 
literatura disponível a não ser unanime. 
 
Neste trabalho iremos propor um método de avaliação diferente para este tipo de 
projecto, baseado no modelo Black-Scholes e mostrar algumas vantagens não explícitas 
que o uso da avaliação através de opções pode ter quando estudada. 
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1 - Introduction 
 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have emerged, over the years, as one of the major 
approaches for delivering infrastructure projects, providing a number of benefits to the 
public sector, such as alleviating the financial burden on the public sector due to rising 
infrastructure costs and allowing some risks to be transferred to the private sector and 
providing more efficient and reliable services at a lower cost (Kwak et al, 2009). 
 
This work focuses on infrastructure PPPs (more specifically on roads) as defined by 
Savas (2000) as an arrangement where government states its need for capital-intensive, 
long-lived infrastructure, and the desired facility is built using a complex combination 
of government and (mostly) private financing, after which it is operated by a private 
entity under a long-term franchise, contract or lease. The payments usually span over 
twenty to 99 years and cover construction, operation, maintenance and capital costs.  
 
PPPs have different objectives for the different intervenients. The private party sees this 
as an investment opportunity capable of generating profits. Meanwhile the public sector 
sees this as an opportunity to generate value for money (maximum efficiency for public 
funds) through synergies and higher efficiency levels from the private party. 
 
PPP valuation has always been a sensible subject given all its specifications and long-
term commitment represented by both state and private investors. Given Portugal's 
current financial and budgetary situation and the public perception that the private 
investor has more favorable conditions when compared to the public sector, it is of 
paramount importance to find alternative valuation methods and compare not only the 
results but also the reasons for discrepancies. 
 
The Black-Scholes Model (Black & Scholes, 1973), from now on referred to as BSM, 
was first devised as a mathematical model to evaluate derivative investment 
instruments. This model is often used, especially by option markets participants. 
 
Applying the BSM to real options and investments has been presented in academic 
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papers (see Luehrman, 1998). Despite this fact, only the South Korean Government has 
applied this to their PPP project evaluations as explained by Jay-hyung, Jungwook, 
Sunghwan and Seung-yeon, (Jay-hyung et al, 2011). 
 
This study will focus on four main research questions: 
1. How to evaluate a PPP risk? 
2. Is the Black Scholes an adequate method to evaluate PPP risk? 
3. How to use the BS model on PPPs? 
4. What valuation does this model yield to Portuguese PPPs? 
 
This work will focus on using the BSM and some of its more common variations, 
suiting them to the Portuguese specifications and inputs. We will use the real inputs 
used for predictions made at the time of the original contractualisation and using those 
empirical resources, see whether there are significant discrepancies between our new 
evaluation and the initial one and study not only why these differences arose but also 
why they are significant. We will then compare the results from our model with what 
they would be by copying the South Korean Model. 
 
The objective of this thesis is to ascertain whether the PPPs were originally licensed at a 
fair price and whether the model used was one of the reasons for the under or 
overpricing of the investment opportunities. This will be an innovative study, not only 
because it will adapt a seldom-used model in PPP valuation but also because it will be 
the only one to do so with the real Portuguese PPP values, using the original values as 
of the date the deal was made. 
 
Having reached the final values for our valuations of the PPPs, we can address the main 
question of this study of whether the different valuation method results in differing 
valuations or not. This will provide valuable input in analysing the main PPP concerns 
about their equity and income distribution between participants. 
 
 
This paper is organized as follows. 




In section 2 we provide a literature review that gives the basis for our work and 
provides an historical overview on PPP history and which financial models are usually 
followed in an evaluation. 
 
Section 3 provides the history on Portuguese PPPs with a special focus on road PPPs. 
 
Section 4 expands our methodology and explains which data we are going to use in our 
model. 
 
Section 5 will provide the results yielded by the model we created, based on the 
explanations from the previous sector. 
 
Section 6 provides the conclusions, limitations of the work and possible relevant future 
work in this area. 
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2 - Literature Review 
2.1 What are PPPs? 
 
Over the last decades a new concept has emerged regarding public investment and 
services: Public Private Partnerships (from here on referred to as PPPs). OECD (2008) 
gives us some background information on these, stating that despite the fact private 
firms have been involved in public service delivery for a long time, PPPs as we know 
them today were only introduced in the early 1990s. 
 
PPPs are defined as an agreement between the government and one or more private 
partners. According to which the private partners deliver the service in such a manner 
that the service delivery objectives of the government are aligned with the profit 
objectives of the private partners and where the effectiveness of the alignment depends 
on a sufficient transfer of risk to the private partners.  Kwak, Chih and Ibbs (Kwak  et 
al, 2009) do a fantastic work on explaining the importance of PPPs for any developed 
country's economy. 
 
Because many governments experience the pressure of fiscal deficits and increasing 
public debt burdens, by the mid-1990s the perceived promise of private financing was 
alluring, especially for large infrastructure projects (such as roads). 
 
The above-mentioned 2008 OECD document states that the introduction of PPPs also 
raised a series of political, economic and technical questions, such as whether there 
should be public or private provision of services traditionally provided by the public 
sector. The answer to this question involves economic and political choices that depend 
on the relative efficiency of public services in a given country, on the availability of 
capital and on the social consensus about acceptable ways of delivering certain services. 
The economic question in particular concerns issues such as contract management and 
risk sharing, which should be done with the purpose of maximizing value for money. 
 
Lewis (2001) gives several relevant arguments why PPPs can be advantageous for the 
public sector. The first one is derived from tackling the popular argument that PPPs 
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allow investment to exist that would otherwise have not been possible due to financial 
restrictions from the public sector. This argument, however, may not hold true since 
PPPs still draw on public funds, the only difference being the time frame under which 
the public payments are made. These payments must, in turn, cover operating costs as 
well as giving return on capital. 
 
This fact means that PPPs offer other attractive features to governments other than just 
value for money. Besides making it possible for a country which lacks infrastructure and 
faces an uncertain fiscal climate to invest in major infrastructure, it also has the great 
advantage of offering predictable costs and effective funding. PPPs ensure consideration 
on whole-of-life costs and budgeting necessities for both infrastructure and related 
services, providing predictability of financial needs for the public sector over the life of 
the project and reduce the risk of funds being diverted. This also ensures that 
government payments only start when specifications are achieved, thus removing any 
operational risk from the public sector, by bundling into private hands the tasks of 
design, finance, construction, operations and maintenance. 
 
Current support for PPPs rely primarily on the claim that they are seen as providing 
better value for money than alternative models of procurement. Value for money is 
associated with economy, efficiency and effectiveness (Shaoul, 2005) and is based on 
the idea that PPPs can produce services at least equivalent to the quality that would be 
presented by the public sector but at lower cost. 
 
Current literature claims that essentially, because of superior risk allocation and the 
benefits to be derived from cooperative partnership relationships, such as important 
benefits for risk allocation, since it implies a commitment to deal with unforeseen 
contingencies cooperatively instead of rigorous interpretation of contractual terms 
several synergies can be had and economic value added from the sharing of risks, 
despite having a drawback some inflexibility since parties cannot dispose of their 
interest without the consent of their fellow partners (Quiggin, 2006).  
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2.2 VfM and risk allocation 
 
A popular view is that public sector financing is always cheaper than that obtained by 
private sector borrowers, thus meaning, so the argument goes, that PPPs are never value 
for money. Lewis (2001) draws on the CEDA (1999) and Giliber and Steinherr (1994) 
argument that proves this conclusion too simplistic. The first concern is that the lower 
government financing costs ignore the fact that public debt is not riskless in its entirety. 
In effect, governments enjoy lower risk as they can resort to general and "inflation" 
taxation to avoid bankruptcy. This focus on taxation needs to be built into social risk 
calculations, with conventional public financing and its discount rate needing to factor 
in the indirect costs that arise from higher public borrowing in the face of possible 
adverse macroeconomic outcomes and eventual externalities. 
 
To study the effectiveness of PPPs, first we have to understand the risks present to each 
entity in the process. Grimsey and Lewis (2002) give us an accurate and succinct 
preview of this: 
 
TABLE I 








/  Contingent 
risks up to 
financial close. 




Sponsor Impact on return. 
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Lewis (2001) does a very complete analysis of the risks present in PPPs. There are 
several conclusions from his work that we should keep in mind, such as the fact that 
demand risk is not necessarily bundled into the contract agreement and may remain in 
the hands of the public sector. The study of the risks present in the project and whether 
these should be bundled into the private sector is one of the most important aspects in 
this area since unloading inappropriate forms of risk merely adds unnecessary costs to a 
PPP agreement. This means that only appropriate levels of risk should be transferred. 
Risk management - identification, assessment, allocation and its mitigation is central to 
the success of PPP delivery of value for money. 
 
The allocation of risk is the central issue in contracting with the driving principle of 
negotiation, aiming to allocate the risk to whoever is able to manage it at the least cost, 
whilst always taking into account public interest (Quiginn, 2006). That is to say, risks 
should be allocated to whoever is the most efficient at dealing with them, bringing 
advantages to all parties involved in the project. 
 
Lewis, like Quiginn, strongly focuses on risk allocation and finding out who is the most 
fit to manage them. The distribution of inappropriate risks to the private sector means 
adding more costs to a PPP than is necessary. This is especially relevant since the 
private sector does not bear risk cheaply. According to the value for money argument, 
the government may agree to assume some of the risks for which the other party would 
grossly overcharge if faced with the necessity of entirely assuming that risk. 
 
The usual procedure is for the private party to take on risks that can be appropriately 
priced, managed and mitigated. This is usually done by transferring the risk to another 
party, by way of subcontracting or insurance. This is the main motivator behind SPVs 
being composed of a consortium of private companies such as debt financiers, equity 
investors, a design and/or construction contractor, along with government advisors. This 
means that when risks such as a design for a project possibly not being suitable for the 
designated purpose, having an experienced and insured designer greatly mitigates this 
risk. The private sector is then willing to accept a risk and earn a return for it (Lewis, 
2001). 




Optimal risk allocation aims to minimize the chances of project risk materializing, as 
well as their consequences if they do, as described by Lewis. This author also takes a 
special interest in the risks that are completely outside the control of both parties. In 
these cases, since none of the hosts has control, risk allocation assessment is more 
subjective and it should reflect how the private sector expects to be reimbursed for 
taking this risk and whether it is reasonable for the government to pay this price. This is 
done for taking into account what the probability of that risk materializing is, if the 
government has any ability to mitigate this risk and its cost to the government. 
Alternatively, the parties can also split the risk. 
 
It is obvious that in the subject of managing the risks, nothing is free. While bidding for 
a project, the private party considers the project's risks and their potential impacts on 
revenues, fighting these by setting premiums to insulate itself from the financial results 
of materialized risks. This is a form of self-insurance as a way of weighing both the 
likelihood and the costs of adverse events happening. An explicit insurance can also be 
procured for certain risk, using insurance brokers, for example. 
 
This also means that private providers are willing to accept most risks, provided that the 
premium is high enough. This means that it is in the hands of the government to analyze 
each risk and assess which decision brings more value for money (allocating a specific 
risk to the private sector or retaining it). According to Lewis (2001), typical risks the 
government might retain are, for example, risks of legislation or policy change affecting 
the project, risks of the government wanting to change service standards or some 
elements of pre-existing latent defects. 
 
In any project of this size involving the public sector, there is a considerable amount of 
political pressure around it. Authors like Quiginn (2006) state that governments have 
found it politically advantageous to bundle all contractual relationships into a single 
contract, making it less transparent and increasing some risks faced by the government, 
such as those associated with renegotiation, while passing other risks to the financiers 
who put together the consortium required for this kind of bundling. The result of this is, 
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generally speaking, the transfer of too much risk, and opportunities to unbundle risks 
are foreited, thus losing on an amount of the value created by the project. 
 
A clear example of this bundling of risks referred on the paragraph above is the transfer 
of demand risk. Demand for road projects are not severely dictated by the services 
offered by it (since there are none that are sufficiently relevant to the user) nor by its 
current state (as long as it does not pose a safety threat, it isn't of significant relevance to 
the driver). It is easy to see that the factors that actually influence traffic are fuel taxes, 
provisions of public transport and urban development policy, which are all out of arm's 
length of the private sector provider. As such, this is one of the risks that have no 
economical advantage to pass on to the private sector and would only be pursued for 
political or, arguably, moral reasons. In our assignment the demand risk is modeled as 
being held entirely by the public partner. 
 
The need for contractual flexibility is another problem this type of investment faces. As 
stated by Vajdíc, Damnjanović (2011), the need for this arises from the nature and 
complexity of investments of this type, which present long term obligations between 
contract parties and a complex number of associated risks. This means that contractual 
flexibility, giving rise to a right to make changes in investment decisions according to 
the project's future performance, could be greatly beneficial to all parties involved. 
Applying real option theory to these projects emulates this kind of flexibility, increasing 
project value and a better sharing of project risks between the parties. 
  
2.3 A literature survey on BSM 
 
The Black Scholes model was first presented by Fischer Black and Myron Scholes in 
their 1973 paper The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, which stated that if 
options were correctly priced in the market, it should not be possible to make sure 
profits by creating portfolios of long and short positions in options and their underlying 
stocks and, from this principle, a theoretical valuation formula for options is derived. 
 
This paper presents the BS Model which gives a simple solution to find the correct 
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pricing of financial options. This model assumes several "ideal conditions" for the 
derivations done: 
 
1. The short-term interest rate is known and constant over time;  
2. The stock price follows a random walk in continuous time with a variance 
rate proportional to the square of the stock price. Thus the distribution of 
possible stock prices at the end of any finite interval is log-normal. The 
variance rate of the return on the stock is constant; 
3. The stock pays no dividends or other distributions; 
4. The option is “European” that is, can only be exercised at maturity; 
5. There are no transaction costs in buying or selling the stock or the option; it 
is possible to borrow at any fraction of the price of a security to buy it or 
hold it at the short-term interest rate;  
6. There are no penalties to short selling. A seller who does not own a security 
will simply accept the price of the security from a buyer, and will agree to 
settle with the buyer on some future date by paying him an amount equal to 
the price of the security on that date. 
 
The original BSM that presents these assumptions had a very significant impact on the 
finance world and has since been studied profusely. As a result, these assumptions have 
been studied over the years and the ones relevant to this paper can be relaxed or just 
removed and the original model adapted in ways that we will show as the opportunity 
arises. The ones that can not be relaxed will have to be assumed as a hindrance to our 
work and should be addressed in future work. Below we will show the treatment and 
our justification related to each of the original assumptions: 
 
1. After the original paper was published and the BSM started being used profusely 
in valuing securities, this assumption was disregarded by investors and studies 
done in this specific case show that in reality a long-term approach can even 
reduce the bias present in the form of Kurtosis and Skewness (Black et al, 2004); 
2. This is one of several possibilities of approaching the variance problem present 
in any valuation. However, the forecast of the variance proposes the same 
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problem for this model as it does for any other investment variance problem. We 
have chosen to follow the route suggested by Luerhman (1998) that says that 
one way to estimate volatility is to compute the implied volatility of the 
investment by using prices of securities traded in the market for which all 
parameters are known except the volatility. We have chosen several stocks 
publicly listed that have as a main business revenue source road PPPs; 
3. Since in our case the BSM applies to a stand-alone project that has a conclusion 
date, we can ignore this assumption as long as we consider the cost of incurring 
the reinvestment fallacy as described by Kelleher & MacCormack (2005). 
However, since our reinvestment rate is the investor's cost of equity, the effect of 
this investment should be null since, as described by Myers and Majluf (1984), 
if the SPV decided to reinvest the equity holders’ cash flows, they should have 
sufficient financial flack to do it; 
4. This assumption has shown numerous times that it can be relaxed, but it is 
irrelevant to our study since we decided to issue our options as European 
Options anyway; 
5. We will hold this assumption as is usual in academic papers. This is an 
assumption of our paper since these are not commonly traded options in the 
market. This topic will be touched upon again in the last chapter; 
6. Irrelevant to our case since the BSM is applied to a specific investment with 
only one equity investor (the SPV, which in turn can have several investors); 
 
This model has been through several adaptations through the years. One of the most 
relevant for our study was the one done by Luehrman (1998), which sees investment 
opportunities as Real Options, very similarly to the approach done by the South Korean 
Government as explained by Jay-hyung et al (2011). The South Korean method follows 
the Luehrman real option model, in which an investment opportunity is more adequately 
evaluated according to the Black Scholes Model. 
 
Traditionally, detailed real investment valuations are based on discounted cash flows 
coupled with a NPV valuation. This, however, as pointed by authors referred to in the 
previous paragraph may hide some shadow advantages present in real investment 
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opportunities. Having a real option means that the potential investor has the possibility, 
for a limited amount of time, of either choosing for or against a final investment 
decision and its identification is, for this reason highly prized by corporate management 
(Carlsson & Fullér, 2003). 
 
Since, at any given time, the benefits resulting from exercising the option are uncertain, 
the existence of a time to expiration is highly valued by potential investors, because it 
gives time for managers to collect more information on the investment and see how the 
factors affecting the investment change over time. 
 
This represents the main difference between NPV valuation and a BSM valuation 
applied to real investment opportunities. In a real investment valuation utilizing the 
BSM and modeling it as a call option, the call value is, implicitly, a sum of both the 
project's intrinsic value (which yields the same result as a NPV valuation) and the time 
value of being able to defer the investment (in reality, the time lapse between realizing 
we have an investment opportunity and having to take it) and represents the real value 
that the investment opportunity represents to the option holder. 
 
2.4 Studies on PPP valuation 
 
With the explanation from the previous paragraphs we can see why we have chosen the 
South Korean approach as the most accurate model when valuating PPPs. The main 
reason why this happens is due to the complex negotiation rounds necessary in these 
types of investments and that give rise to time intervals between the first valuations and 
the final investment decision, while at the same time, many of these areas being 
discussed may hold little impact on the investment value as stated by the think-tank 
OCDE (2008). After the final negotiations, several rounds of approval must be made by 
public institutions (finance ministry, transport ministry and a final statement from the 
Portuguese court of accounts on whether the project is financially sound for the public 
sector) until the final public signing of the contract.  
 
Naturally, until the final contractual signing, if the factors that affect the value of the 
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investment do not evolve favourably, the private would-be investor can bow out of the 
investment, having as a last resort option the possibility of writing-off the realized 
investment in the SPV (a subsidiary or a joint-venture with limited responsability for the 
investors). While in the process of deciding whether to write-off the realized investment 
or not, it should be important to see that these losses are sunken losses and should not 
influence future decisions. 
 
The conditions described in the above paragraphs are why we are confident in saying 
that this situation gives rise to a real option where the decision is whether to continue 
and complete the rest of the necessary investment or bow out of the project. The 
exercise price is the remaining value of the investment and the time to maturity of the 
option is the amount of time after the initial offer and before the final agreement of 
terms and signing of the contract. In this situation the BSM is more adequate than the 
NPV model since it will take into account the value of the investment and the time 
deferral between recognizing the investment opportunity and having to make the final 
investment decision. 
 
Applying the BSM to a real project can also help us create several other scenarios where 
issuing financial options on the project can help us on several scenarios, such as 
diminishing the amount of interest-bearing funds with collateral outside the actual 
investment to start the project. This is done in our project by having the SPV selling call 
options to foreign speculators. According to Bullock & Hayes (1992), options are the 
preferred instrument for speculation and this could be used to the advantage of the 
investment holders. It is feasible to issue financial options on the project since the 
assets, income streams and obligations of the private party are by nature tradable and 
there is a market for it, provided we find a buyer. 
 
By selling a call with a future exercise date to a speculator, the SPV is earning cash 
flows today at the expense of a potential future upside in the market conditions. The 
incentive for the SPV to do this is that this way it would need to issue less equity or 
contract a lower amount of debt to finance the project. In the results chapter we will see 
what impact this has for the equity holders. 




Another way in which issuing options under the BSM valuation can be helpful and 
present several advantage to the SPV investors is using them to hedge the risks 
surrounding the investment and deferring the final divestment decision until a further 
date when the investors have more information. This is specially useful, due to the main 
determinant of a road PPP success being the payments made by the state to the SPV and 
since we are in the middle of a financial crisis that has placed large financial and 
political pressure on the public entity to cut transfers to private partners. With this 
context of political uncertainty the holders of the investment and any parties potentially 
interested in the investment may be fearful of potential future cuts to their revenues. 
 
Hedging by buying a put option would give the decision makers more time to appreciate 
the convoluted political positions and make sense of which rumors should be taken 
seriously and which should not. In a sense, by buying a put option, the decision-maker 
is buying time to assess the future developments to the factors that affect his investment. 
After buying the put option he can afford to wait before the final decision, since he 
knows he will always have a guaranteed value for the investment (the strike price) if he 
wishes to exercise the option.  
 
As in any valuation, however, besides our main valuation model, several other tools can 
also be studied. Specially relevant to our case is one of the most commonly used tools in 
business valuation: Discounted Payback Period, defined by Berk and DeMarzo (2010) 
as the number of years that it takes for a project to break even from their initial 
investment, after having discounted all future cash flows to a moment zero. When 
coupled with the BSM model, we have can use our model for several purposes, namely 
to reduce the amount of capital at risk. 
 
2.5 Main Findings 
 
To endeavor to make a study of this kind, firstly we need to define exactly what we are 
studying and what our purpose is. Having taken as the definition for PPPs one accepted 
by OCDE, we could then follow on to find out what the motivations for engaging in 
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PPPs are for each party and what risks each of them is exposed to. 
 
Having done that, we could then define more precisely the broad subject, which is 
Value-for-Money and how much of an important variable it is in the study of PPPs. This 
leads to us to study in more detail the risks inherent in road PPPs and see how the 
distribution of these (usually in bundles) among the participants affects the solidity of 
these projects. 
 
This leads us to the importance of flexibility in the contracts and how options may help 
us achieve that. After defining the valuation model and why it can (and should) be 
applied in this case and under which assumptions we can then use it and reach a final 
valuation. Coordinating the presented model with the need for flexibility in order to 
generate more economic value we can see how options could be good for the investors. 
 
This work has the particularity of being one of the first papers making the case that 
PPPs should be evaluated with the BSM similarly to the model used by the South 
Korean Government. In Portugal, this is still unexplored, as of yet. 
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3 - Portuguese Case 
 
Given Portugal's current financial and political conditions, it is even more relevant to 
study a Portuguese case relating to PPPs. According to Sarmento, Reis (2013), PPPs in 
Portugal started in 1993 and involve transportation, health projects and to a lesser extent 
security facilities. The road sector is clearly the leading sector in PPPs, representing 
three-quarters of the total budget effort for PPPs. 
 
In Portugal and the rest of the world the most common model for road PPPs is a build-
operate-transfer (BOT) type of project. In this scheme the private party builds and 
finances the operation of the PPP for the duration of the concession before transferring 
the ownership of the investment back to the state. In return the private sector is entitled 
to collect tolls from users or receive payments from the public sector or any 
combination of both Vajdíc & Damnjanović (2011). These payments may also scale 
proportionally to traffic volumes but, in the case being modeled, the payments are fixed 
and independent of traffic. 
 
According to the same paper, the total effort represented by private investment is a very 
big one for the country being studied, totaling EUR 30 billion (79% of which on roads), 
which led some to worry about whether these investments could be afforded or not. 
Future payments related to these contracts represent an annual effort of up to 1% of 
GDP from 2014 until 2020 and an effort higher than 0.5% of GDP until 2030. 
 
These facts, coupled with the troika intervention and their interest in re-evaluating the 
PPPs underway and their value for money, make a more detailed analysis of the road 
PPPs specially relevant. This is another reason why in this study we try to find 
alternative valuations for them and see if the economic value by them is being explored 
to the fullest, either by identifying, managing and exercising several real options or by 
creating financial options with these real investments as the underlying asset. 
 
This work establishes the necessary framework for further work to be done and leading 
to a more detailed study of the Portuguese road PPP scenario. It also makes it possible 
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to study whether taking into account the possibilities associated with options along the 
several phases of the investment can bring more value for money for all the parties 
involved in the project. 
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4 - Methodology & Data 
 
We applied the BS Model to a real investment opportunity. This method of evaluation 
requires several steps similar to those required by a regular NPV valuation, such as 
computing the expected flows to the firm or to the equity. 
 
Considering the literature presented in chapter 2, we can see that the inputs required for 
the BS Model when applied to a real investment opportunity are translated in the 
following way: 
 
 S0 – PV of a project's operating assets and future cash flows to be acquired; 
 X - Expenditure required to acquire the project assets (usually designated by K 
in the standard BSM); 
 t – Length of time the decision may be deferred; 
 r – Time value of money; 
 σ^2 – Riskiness of the project assets. 
 
With these we can compute the inherent value to the holder of the right to follow 

















 Tdd  12  
 
Where c and p are the values of European call and put options, correspondingly.  
 
The next step was to discover what we consider as appropriate information to fill each 
variable. Since when the PPP reaches its maturity the asset ownership goes back to the 
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state, the S0 is the present value of all future positive FCFEs. Since not all PPPs start 
turning positive FCFEs after a fixed amount of years (due to different scaling of 
payments) we assume that X is the sum of the discounted FCFEs until the first year of 
positive FCFE forecasts. 
 
The BSM still required filling in the data for two other variables: Time value of money 
or risk-free rate (r) and the riskiness of the project (σ). We used as a proxy for the risk-
free rate the 30-year German Bunds as quoted on the issue date of the option, and as the 
measure of investment volatility we will be using the historical volatility of quoted 
companies that operate in similar investments as this one.  
 
Both the solutions referred in the previous chapter are common in the world of finance 
with Tobin (1997) referring that using the return on government bonds is normally 
perceived as a good proxy for the risk-free rate. Luerhman (1998) refers to our second 
assumption stating that we can get implied volatilities for shares for companies in 
industries similar to ours. 
 
For our study of implied volatilities we searched for the publicly quoted companies with 
a business model as close as possible to the business underlying our  PPPs. We used as 
proxies the following companies: Brisa, Abertis, Acciona, CCR. 
 
TABLE II 
RISK-FREE VALUE ACCORDING TO THE YEAR IN QUESTION 
Year 1999 2008 2009 2012
r 4,418% 4,419% 2,554% 16,076%  
 
In this work the focus was on the final equity investor in the SPV and that is the reason 
why we did the forecasts of the project's inherent value based on its FCFE. We managed 
to do this by forecasting its expected revenues and costs over the years of the project to 
its maturity. Any forecast has underlying its results several assumptions and ours is no 
exception. Our assumptions will be listed and explained below. The forecast of the 
FCFE will be as follows: 
 




VARIABLES RELEVANT TO THE FORECAST OF FCFE EXPLAINED 
Variable Assumptions and Reasoning 
Revenues According to the payments agreed in the concession contract. 
- O&M 
First year O&M from the concession contract and increasing at the 
predicted inflation rate of 2% (ECB guidelines). 
= EBITDA Revenues - O&M 
- D&A 
D&A is computed through a constant quota equally distributed over 
the years in which the SPV explores the roads. 
=EBIT EBITDA - D&A 
- Interest Project Outstanding Debt * (6M Euribor + Project Spread) 
=EBT EBIT - Interest 
- Taxes (EBT - Eligible Net Loss Rollovers) * Tax Rate 
= Net Income EBT - Taxes 
- CAPEX 
The CAPEX is invested over a period of four years in the SCUTS 
cases and five years in the subconcessions (except the Pinhal 
Interior which was over six years). 
- ΔNWC Assumed as zero. 
+ D&A Same as above. 
+ ΔDebt 
Debt levels are quantified in the public contracts and it is now a 
question of modeling its gradual entrance into the SPV. We assume 
that debt levels increase in the construction years as a flat 
percentage of the CAPEX values and are repaid in constant terms 
over the years. The maturity of each debt is stated in the PPP 
contracts.  
= FCFE Unlevered Net Income - ΔNWC + D&A + ΔDebt 
 
After forecasting the yearly FCFE all we needed to do was to compute them back to the 
starting year of each investment at the cost of equity rate. The reason why we wanted to 
compute the FCFE and not the more standard free cash flows to the firm is so we could 
showcase the importance that the interest and debt repayment amounts paid have, so it 
could be easily concluded that the main financial burden to the SPV is the service of 





The equity rate used to compute the FCFEs in the SCUTS is taken from the public 
contracts of the SCUTS in which those values were reached and agreed on. Since we 
did not explicitly have these values for the subconcessions dated from 2009, we had to 
deduct these values. The cost of equity is commonly defined as the risk-free rate plus 
the market risk premium times the sensibility of the industry to its changes. Since we 
knew the risk-free rate at date 1999, we deducted it from the weighted average cost of 
equity from the SCUTS (weighted for total equity values) and got the industry's market 
risk premium. Since in 2009 the financial crisis was still not at its peak, there is no 
reason for this risk premium to change significantly and this is the most accurate proxy 
we can find for our subconcessions cost of equity. 
 
It is the objective of the European Central Bank to set and actively pursue as an 
inflation target 2% per year and we will assume that in the years following the start of 
the investment the ECB will achieve its target. O&M is a clear example in which the 
prices present in the contracts generally arise from long-term commitments and are 
updated according to the general price increases in a certain economy, so we will 
assume that the only change over the years in the O&M prices is related to the inflation 
rates over the years. 
 
Using the fact that we have a later evaluation period of the project, we can have a more 
accurate forecast of the interest costs of each project (since most of the financial burden 
comes from the Euribor rate), and we will be using the historical values for years 1999 
to 2013 by averaging the values of each year. For the years 2014-2016 we will use the 
futures values (all values taken during May) and assume the futures value of the year 
2016 since this is the most recent data available and will serve as a proxy rate for the 
following years. 
 




EURIBOR 6M AVERAGE HISTORY AND FORECAST 
 























Traditionally in Corporate Finance, yearly changes in Net Working Capital has to be 
assumed when computing the FCFE, but in our case none of its major components are 
significant and we assume there would be no significant NWC investment or changes 
over the years in roads investments.  
 
With all the information relayed in this chapter all we have to do is compute the yearly 
FCFE values at the cost of equity of each specific project as was described above. 
 
The model we created tries, as any academic model, to produce a model that can be 
replicated for any investment with similar characteristics to the ones being originally 
studied. Due to the fact that roads are all necessarily in different places and have 
different lengths, it is impossible to find a sufficiently adequate generalization for 
revenues with origins other than state transfer (which generate most of the value of the 
investment). Examples of this type of alternative revenues are then spaces rented to 
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companies having petrol stations in the roads. 
 
For similar reasons, and since it varies deeply from firm to firm that is proposing to 
build and operate the PPP, it is impossible to include in a reliable model the indirect 
costs that arise from these investments, such as financing, accounting and legal fees. 
Future users of this model should find it easy to correct for this, using real data for the 
investment they are studying. The way to apply these changes should be immediate 
since these are considered as accounting income or losses and can just be added or 
subtracted to the model under revenues or OPEX. 
 
After adequately inputting the values in each variable, we reach the real option value of 
the investment opportunity, which takes into account not only the net present value of 
the investment but also the time value of the possibility of discarding the investment. In 
the computations we assumed a 1-year decision deferral period. 
 
Having reached the final values for our valuations of the PPPs we can address the main 
question of whether these investment opportunities present advantages to the investors 
in the SPVs. 
 
This MFW does, however, also aim to show that using options in real investment 
opportunities offers other advantages to the entities involved, such as minimizing risks 
or the amount of capital required at the beginning of the project. Options are well 
known as both hedging and financing tools, and we will aim to show that on any new or 
ongoing real investments options present several useful possibilities. 
 
It is interesting to see the high level debt takes when compared to the total investment 
values. This means that the equity investors will have to provide comparatively low 
amounts of funds when compared to debt holders. However, by using options the equity 
investors can even lower the amount of funds required by selling a call option for a 
future date, making it possible to effectively reduce the amount of interest-bearing 
liabilities in their portfolio by sacrificing part of a possible future upside in the business 
value. In our example we have set as an exercise date for this option the first day of the 
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year in which the investment reaches its discounted payback period. 
 
By setting the issue date of this option at the starting day of the investment (or just 
before) we can lower the amount of traditional equity funding required by the equity 
holders. This way the shareholder will receive an inflow at moment zero of the project, 
and at the payback year and exercise date of the options, he will either receive the 
exercise price, if conditions become more advantageous for whoever holds the 
investment, or the remainder of payments, if the call option owner chooses not to 
exercise. This is also why the option issuer is receiving the initial inflow at the expense 
of cashing in potential future upsides in the valuation, because if conditions become 
more advantageous for him he will probably lose ownership of the project, since the 
option owner would exercise its option and take control away from the original SPV 
owners. 
 
Speculators could be very interested in buying options such as the ones described in this 
paper, since it would be an effective way of exploring potential upsides of changes on 
the several factors underlying the investment, such as interest rates. Another reason why 
it could be appealing would be if the buyers of the call option had not had access to the 
initial bidding and thought they could outperform the current SPV in operating or 
financing terms. 
 
Another way in which options could be used would be to hedge against possible future 
risks. Hedging is when we take up a position on another investment (usually a financial 
security) that offsets some of the exposure risk on our main investment. With financial 
options we could, for example, buy a put option that would guarantee us a certain 
amount (the strike price) regardless of future events. 
 
From our explanation of hedging, and taking into account the fact that we are in a 
climate of grave government financial uncertainty where the equity holders are afraid 
that their main source of income (government transfers) can be cut, it is of interest to 
search for ways in which to diminish risks without having to sacrifice a lot of cash 
flows. Devising an option such as the one described below that helps the equity holders 
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have a better and more informed decision at hand is an often effective way of hedging. 
 
One of the hedging possibilities would be by buying a put option. In the Portuguese 
case for example, in the highly turbulent year of 2012, it might have been of interest to 
take some precautionary measures against the financial crisis and any measures the state 
might have taken in order to curtail transfers to the road PPP SPVs. 
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5 - Results 
 
For comparison reasons it is interesting to see what results a traditional approach such 
as NPV valuation yields for the PPPs being studied: 
 
TABLE V 
PPP NPV VALUATION 
Beira Interior Interior Norte Algarve Costa de Prata Grande Porto Beiras litoral e alta Norte Litoral
PV(S) 240.229 167.856 153.988 141.689 94.595 228.676 238.850
PV(X) -137.106 -109.564 -62.928 -72.856 -158.564 -203.963 -133.854
NPV 103.124 58.291 91.060 68.833 -63.969 24.713 104.996
AE Transmontana Baixo Alentejo Baixo Tejo Algarve Litoral Douro Interior Litoral Oeste Pinhal Interior
PV(S) 146.145 168.944 254.913 193.053 360.212 332.433 640.023
PV(X) -119.195 -109.484 -49.887 -61.282 -136.438 -91.188 -200.650
NPV 26.950 59.459 205.026 131.771 223.774 241.245 439.373  
 
This initial and very standard valuation serves as a starting point for the valuation and as 
a comparison basis to see what effects the factoring in of the time value of being able to 
defer the final investment has on the project's valuation. 
 
Following our explanation in the previous chapters we will now take into account the 
implicit time window to make a final investment decision and valuing it accordingly (by 
creating a call option) we can then reach the following Real Option Values: 
 
TABLE VI 
VALUE CHANGE FOR EACH PPP AND THE WEIGHTED AVERAGE CHANGE 
Beira Interior Interior Norte Algarve Costa de Prata Grande Porto Beiras litoral e alta Norte Litoral
NPV 103.124 58.291 91.060 68.833 -63.969 24.713 104.996
c0 109.696 64.358 93.795 72.131 1.189 46.971 111.330
% Change 6% 10% 3% 5% N/A 90% 6%
WAvg % 14%
AE Transmontana Baixo Alentejo Baixo Tejo Algarve Litoral Douro Interior Litoral Oeste Pinhal Interior
NPV 26.950 59.459 205.026 131.771 223.774 241.245 439.373
c0 37.284 65.461 207.182 134.421 229.686 245.187 448.049
% Change 38% 10% 1% 2% 3% 2% 2%
Wavg % 3%  
 
We can see the effect that factoring in the time deferral we have at our disposal before 
taking the final decision: the real value of the investment increases significantly. In the 
Grande Porto SCUT case, a project with a negative NPV actually presents some value to 
the investor, since given the project's volatility over the course of one year the project 
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can come to present positive values. This is interesting because it shows that by having 
the option to invest, the equity holders can prefer to buy the option and speculate on a 
possible upside in the factors that determine the value of the project, such as interest 
rates or the cost of debt and equity. 
 
The SCUT % increase in value when including the option to invest of one year 
(excluding Grande Porto and weighting the increases for call value) is 14% and 3% for 
the other subconcessions. This means that evaluating the PPPs using only the NPV 
calculations significantly underprices the investments by failing to take into account all 
the tools available to the investor and how these add value to the project. 
 
We can now analyze how we can diminish our amount of invested cash flows at risk. 
We can model a call option issued today to be exercised on the first day of the year just 
after the discounted payback year. With the information gathered before, we reached the 
following years in which the discounted payback period was achieved for each SPV: 
 
TABLE VII 
PAYBACK YEAR FOR EACH PPP 
SCUTS (1999) Beira Interior Interior Norte Algarve Costa de Prata Grande Porto Beiras litoral e alta Norte Litoral
Payback Year 2011 2013 2013 2010 N/A 2020 2018
Subconcessions (2009) AE Transmontana Baixo Alentejo Baixo Tejo Algarve Litoral Douro Interior Litoral Oeste Pinhal Interior
Payback Year 2035 2029 2015 2020 2019 2015 2020  
 
Having seen in which year the payback period is achieved, we can model our option in 
the way described in the previous paragraph. We will be selling a call option as a way of 
limiting the necessary inflow of funds to complete the investment phase whilst only 
relinquishing some of the possible future upside.  
 




CALL OPTION VALUE FOR EACH OF THE PPPS 
Beira Interior Interior Norte Algarve Costa de Prata Grande Porto Beiras litoral e alta Norte Litoral
Exercise Date 01-01-2012 01-01-2014 01-01-2014 01-01-2011 N/A 01-01-2022 01-01-2019
S 89.578,2 52.055,2 84.938,3 67.897,0 N/A 20.667,4 104.084,6
X 89.578,2 52.055,2 84.938,3 67.897,0 N/A 20.667,4 104.084,6
r 4,42% 4,42% 4,42% 4,42% N/A 4,42% 4,42%
T 13 15 15 12 N/A 23 20
σ 32,09% 32,09% 32,09% 32,09% N/A 32,09% 32,09%
c0 53.358,1 33.120,0 54.041,7 38.929,8 N/A 15.672,8 74.824,0
AE Transmontana Baixo Alentejo Baixo Tejo Algarve Litoral Douro Interior Litoral Oeste Pinhal Interior
Exercise Date 01-01-2032 01-01-2028 01-01-2016 01-01-2021 01-01-2020 01-01-2016 01-01-2021
S 21.683,3 57.622,4 189.060,0 124.240,3 205.405,0 237.974,8 408.938,4
X 21.683,3 57.622,4 189.060,0 124.240,3 205.405,0 237.974,8 408.938,4
r 2,55% 2,55% 2,55% 2,55% 2,55% 2,55% 2,55%
T 33 29 17 22 21 17 22
σ 32,09% 32,09% 32,09% 32,09% 32,09% 32,09% 32,09%
c0 16.864,6 42.859,4 113.343,5 83.122,0 134.826,1 142.668,4 273.597,1  
 
The value of the call presented above refers to the value that the equity investor will 
receive at the beginning of the investment period and represents a commitment to sell in 
case the option holder would wish to exercise the option. Taking as an example the 
Litoral Oeste Subconcession, we can see how this affects cash flows over the 
concession period. 
 




CASH FLOWS FOR THE LITORAL OESTE SUBCONCESSION WITH/WITHOUT EXERCISING THE 
CALL OPTION 
2009i -11.325 142.668 131.343 383.914 131.343 2009i -11.325 142.668 131.343 383.914 131.343
2009 -15.781 -15.781 115.563 2009 -15.781 0 -15.781 115.563
2010 -15.629 -15.629 99.934 2010 -15.629 0 -15.629 99.934
2011 -16.999 -16.999 82.935 2011 -16.999 0 -16.999 82.935
2012 -16.438 -16.438 66.496 2012 -16.438 0 -16.438 66.496
2013 -15.016 -15.016 51.480 2013 -15.016 0 -15.016 51.480
2014 46.097 46.097 97.577 2014 46.097 0 46.097 97.577
2015 48.362 48.362 145.939 2015 48.362 237.975 286.337 383.914
2016 44.482 44.482 190.420 2016
2017 41.404 41.404 231.824 2017
2018 38.547 38.547 270.372 2018
2019 35.894 35.894 306.265 2019
2020 33.435 33.435 339.700 2020
2021 31.134 31.134 370.834 2021
2022 28.994 28.994 399.828 2022
2023 6.599 6.599 406.427 2023
2024 1.567 1.567 407.994 2024
2025 -2.733 -2.733 405.261 2025
2026 -3.499 -3.499 401.762 2026
2027 -3.035 -3.035 398.728 2027
2028 -2.210 -2.210 396.517 2028
2029 -1.168 -1.168 395.350 2029
2030 -995 -995 394.354 2030
2031 -1.342 -1.342 393.013 2031
2032 -884 -884 392.129 2032
2033 -926 -926 391.203 2033
2034 -908 -908 390.295 2034
2035 -755 -755 389.541 2035
2036 -594 -594 388.946 2036
2037 -463 -463 388.484 2037
2038 61 61 388.544 2038
2039 -1.491 -1.491 387.054 2039
2040 -1.280 -1.280 385.774 2040
2041 -1.148 -1.148 384.626 2041
2042 -99 -99 384.527 2042
2043 -93 -93 384.434 2043
2044 -88 -88 384.346 2044
2045 -83 -83 384.263 2045
2046 -78 -78 384.185 2046
2047 -74 -74 384.111 2047
2048 -70 -70 384.041 2048
2049 -66 -66 383.976 2049
2050 -62 -62 383.914 2050















Exercised Option ScenarioNon-Exercised Option Scenario
Year
Option CFs (Not 
exercised)
Year






So we can see that by selling an initial call on the payback date (2015 for the case 
discussed here), the equity holders can actually fulfil their contractual obligations by 
completing the investment requirements without having to generate any cash flows to 
invest any amounts in the project other than the ones generated from the project itself 
and the derivatives it can originate. This is made possible by a mixture of high debt 
levels and a clever use of financial options as a financing tool. 
 
When considering the risk hedging aspect of the options, the equity holders can issue a 
put option in order to reach a fairer assessment of what the investment really is worth 
after dismissing or increasing the probability of having the project's revenues cut and 
delaying the final decision on whether the investment should be maintained or not. In 
our example we assume that the general consensus is that, due to the financial crisis, 
there is a 20% chance of a 30% cut to government payments to SPVs. 
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We assumed that the equity holders of the SCUTS would be willing to invest up to 2.5 
million euros to have the right to defer their decision on whether to divest or not after 2 
years and having more information on the effects of the financial crisis on the 
government payments. As for the equity holders of the subconcessions we assumed they 
would be willing to buy a put option for up to 5% value of the future cash flows. 
Additionally we assumed that the option would be issued on the first day of the year 
2012 and would have a time to maturity of two years. Table X below shows what the 
exercise values would be, given a put value according to the description given in this 
paragraph. 
 
These values may be freely changed by future users of the model according to their 
assessment of what each decision maker is willing to pay in order to hold such an 
option. It should be noted that the lower the willingness to pay for the option, the lower 
the exercise value (the price at which they can divest the PPP) will be. 
 
TABLE X 
PUT OPTION VALUE FOR EACH OF THE PPPS 
Beira Interior Interior Norte Algarve Costa de Prata Grande Porto Beiras litoral e alta Norte Litoral
S 58.839,5 48.931,9 79.842,0 40.457,6 43.238,2 69.561,0 145.392,8
X 55.771,7 48.380,8 70.771,1 41.844,7 44.014,3 63.527,2 113.990,6
r 16,08% 16,08% 16,08% 16,08% 16,08% 16,08% 16,08%
T 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
σ 32,09% 32,09% 32,09% 32,09% 32,09% 32,09% 32,09%
p0 2.500,0 2.500,0 2.500,0 2.500,0 2.500,0 2.500,0 2.500,0
AE Transmontana Baixo Alentejo Baixo Tejo Algarve Litoral Douro Interior Litoral Oeste Pinhal Interior
S 137.376,0 158.807,0 239.617,8 181.470,0 338.598,9 312.487,3 572.569,2
X 135.149,2 156.233,1 235.733,8 178.528,5 333.110,3 307.422,3 563.288,4
r 16,08% 16,08% 16,08% 16,08% 16,08% 16,08% 16,08%
T 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
d2 0,51764414 0,517641221 0,517643957 0,517644196 0,517645712 0,517643243 0,517643555
p0 6.868,8 7.940,4 11.980,9 9.073,5 16.929,9 15.624,4 28.628,5  
 
The put values are the values that the SPV holders would be willing to pay today to 
have the opportunity to defer the final decision and be able to gather more information 
before fully committing to a decision. 
 
After structuring the put option we can easily find out under which conditions the put 
option holders would exercise the put according to their more informed perceptions of 
what the government cuts to subsidies would be. 




We have made two simulations for each investment. In the first one it is given that the 
government has already notified the equity holders that they will cut transfers and the 
analysis is made on a basis of what % of transfer cuts is necessary for the equity holders 
to exercise the put. In the second situation, given a certain % of cuts, what would be the 




BREAK-EVEN VALUES FOR THE PUT OPTIONS ON EACH PPP 
Beira Interior Interior Norte Algarve Costa de Prata Grande Porto Beiras litoral e alta Norte Litoral
Break-Even Point 55.771,7 48.380,8 70.771,1 41.844,7 44.014,3 63.527,2 113.990,6
Possible Outcome 1
Planned Revenue 62.595,2 52.055,2 84.938,3 43.040,0 45.998,1 74.001,0 154.673,2
E(Revenue) 55.771,7 48.380,8 70.771,1 41.844,7 44.014,3 63.527,2 113.990,6
p 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
L 10,9% 7,1% 16,7% 2,8% 4,3% 14,2% 26,3%
Possible Outcome 2
Planned Revenue 62.595,2 52.055,2 84.938,3 43.040,0 45.998,1 74.001,0 154.673,2
E(Revenue) 55.771,7 48.380,8 70.771,1 41.844,7 44.014,3 63.527,2 113.990,6
p 36,3% 23,5% 55,6% 9,3% 14,4% 47,2% 87,7%
L 30,0% 30,0% 30,0% 30,0% 30,0% 30,0% 30,0%
AE Transmontana Baixo Alentejo Baixo Tejo Algarve Litoral Douro Interior Litoral Oeste Pinhal Interior
Break-Even Point 135.149,2 156.233,1 235.733,8 178.528,5 333.110,3 307.422,3 563.288,4
Possible Outcome 1
Planned Revenue 146.144,6 168.943,7 254.912,6 193.053,1 360.211,6 332.433,3 609.116,1
E(Revenue) 135.149,2 156.233,1 235.733,8 178.528,5 333.110,3 307.422,3 563.288,4
p 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
L 7,5% 7,5% 7,5% 7,5% 7,5% 7,5% 7,5%
Possible Outcome 2
Planned Revenue 146.144,6 168.943,7 254.912,6 193.053,1 360.211,6 332.433,3 609.116,1
E(Revenue) 135.144,6 156.233,1 235.733,8 178.528,5 333.110,3 307.422,3 563.288,4
p 25,1% 25,1% 25,1% 25,1% 25,1% 25,1% 25,1%
L 30,0% 30,0% 30,0% 30,0% 30,0% 30,0% 30,0%  
Planned Revenue is the initial forecast payment scenarios, the ones we used in our starting 
valuation. E(Revenue) is the expected revenue we will receive taking into account our 
expectations of default at the date that we issue the options. p is the probability of having 
revenues cut and L is the amount of value subject to loss. 
 
The percentages shown above give us some of the many possible combinations of 
perceived probability of losses and amounts of value at risk, above which it would be 
worth exercising the put option at the stipulated exercise values. 
 
Table XI shows us that, regarding the SCUTS, if the Government would announce that 
there would be cuts made to government transfers into the SPVs, the equity holders of 
Beira Litoral e Alta SCUT would exercise the put option if the amount perceived to be 
cut was above 14,2% of government transfers. The lowest threshold for divesting is 
given by the Costa da Prata SCUT which says that if the amount to be cut was above 
2,8% of revenues, the equity holders would divest through the put option. 




As for the Subconcessions, we can see that if the government announced they were 
debating a 30% cut to transfers all investors (given the proposed put value) would divest 
if they attributed a chance of more that 25% of this cut happening.  
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6 - Conclusion, Limitations and Future Work 
 
This paper set out to research the following questions: 
1. How to evaluate a PPP risk? 
2. Is the Black Scholes an adequate method to evaluate PPP risk? 
3. How to use the BS model on PPPs? 
4. What valuation does this model yield to Portuguese PPPs? 
 
From the analysis done in this paper we can see that applying the Black-Scholes Model 
to the road PPP valuation yields different and interesting results when comparing with 
more traditional methods such as NPV. The time value of being able to make a final 
decision later than the opportunity presented itself is frequently ignored by decision-
makers and can have a significant impact on the project's viability. 
 
Another point this paper had set out to prove was that using techniques usually reserved 
for financial securities and applying them with the BSM to a real investment 
opportunity (particularly road PPPs) could yield several benefits for those involved in 
the process. 
 
We set out to prove that the tactics usually reserved to financial securities using the 
BSM could also be applied to real investment opportunities such as the one we were 
analysing. This means setting out to prove not only what different valuation the BSM 
gives when compared to the NPV method but also whether we can use it as a 
speculation or hedging tool. 
 
By studying the different applications of our model to the real investment opportunities 
we can significantly broaden the information available to the investors come decision 
making time. 
 
We prove that some of these projects could be made without resorting to any outside 
financing for the initial investment by only having to sell a right to ownership at a future 
date and for a value that would make it indifferent for the shareholder to see that right 
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exercised or not. 
 
This different approach to real investments also makes it possible to hedge future risks 
related to the operation without having to change anything operationally and having to 
pay the initial value for the right to sell at the future. This is specially relevant since in 
times of high uncertainty (such as the present financial crisis) the shareholders can defer 
any decision of divestment until a time when they have more information and can, in 
this way, more efficiently maximize their payoff whilst reducing risk. 
 
Unfortunately it is impossible, in a work subject to the limitations presented to this one, 
to cover every possible topic of discussion. A specially relevant topic which has not 
been approached is whether the theoretical options described in the assignment would 
find no legal opposition and whether there would be buyers willing to engage in such a 
transaction without charging a large "liquidity discount" since these options would be 
traded over-the-counter and not in a listed exchange. 
 
In this work we applied the real option theory to the projects being studied but solely 
from the perspective of the private party. This work lays the foundation to include real 
options on the contractual negotiations, namely of buy-back or abandonment options. 
This could be especially interesting since factoring real options into the agreement could 
bring advantages to both parties and help them explore possibilities presented to both as 
shown throughout this work. Future Work could devise which possible real options 
present themselves to the parties and which of them add more economic value to the 
project as a whole. 
 
It would be especially relevant to see whether the existence of call-back or 
abandonment options would generate value-for-money by splitting the risks and 
creating, in a way, an upper and lower limit of earnings or responsibilities for both sides. 
 
Related to the possible purposes of real options is also the fact that after the contract is 
formalized, the government loses any capacity to alter the terms and conditions stated in 
the contract to meet changing needs and circumstances. This could bring significant 
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economic advantages to some of the parties except insofar as these can be negotiated 
with the private partner. The private party, however, can capture most of the benefits 
that arise through subcontracting or selling the assets. This way, the public party has 
much of the costs of the partnership but few of the risk allocation benefits. Even though 
we touched on this topic and showed some ways in which real options could help divide 
the benefits through all parties, further work could be done in this area to study what 
consequences it would have in the value distribution and on the willingness of the 
private party to enter into such an agreement if it would mean a loss in the future upside 
potential. 
 
Another point which we were unable to comment on due to space restrictions was 
which treatment to give to the risk-free rate when there is a large financial crisis in the 
country being studied. A point can be made that when there is this much financial 
distress, the risk-free rate cannot be based solely on what the rate of the Treasury Bond 
is. It is important, however, to stress that there is no absolute answer to this question and 
that it would present itself in a more classic approach such as the NPV valuation. 
 
Regarding a more general concern related to PPPs, we would like to see how the 
incentives to invest vary from intervenient to intervenient, especially from the part of 
the banks and whether the high amounts of debt for the SPV create any sort of moral 
hazards and whether the high amount of risks that come with agreeing to finance 98% 
of an investment's initial capital outweigh the gains the project brings. 
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